We investigate the introduction of a minimum quality standard (MQS) in a vertically differentiated duopoly with an environmental externality. We establish that the MQS bites only if the hedonic component of consumer preferences is sufficiently strong. Then, we illustrate an underlying trade-off between the beneficial effects of quality enhancement on prices and the associated undesirable increase in the environmental externality.
tries has focussed on use of MQS regulation to correct the downward distortion of product quality due to market power (see [4, 5, 10] , inter alia). Few efforts have been carried out to investigate the optimal design of an MQS and its consequences in markets where production entails a negative environmental externality. In this vein, Arora and Gangopadhyay [2] , Lutz et al. [8] and André et al. [1] investigate the role of MQS in models where quality has a definite environmental impact. The same feature can be found also in Lombardini-Riipen [7] , where regulation is carried out via taxation on polluting emissions.
In this note, we assess MQS regulation in a duopoly model where quality is a purely hedonic variable and pollution is proportional to the industry output. Accordingly, quality affects the externality only indirectly, via the interplay with equilibrium prices and outputs, but has no intrinsic "green" features. This can be the case in several industries where standards are directed to improve the hedonic quality only, without accounting for the environmental implications of largescale production. One example is consumer electronics, where standards are implemented, e.g. to improve the quality of LCDs for computers and TV sets, or the pharmaceutical industry, where standards intend to protect the patients' health. Focussing on nonenvironmental quality is relevant for all these industries and, as it will be clear shortly, we aim specifically to establish the trade-off between the hedonic quality improvement and the increase in environmental damage.
We consider a framework where the market is not fully covered, implying that firms can endogenously determine the extent of market coverage through their price and quality choices. 1 Unlike an existing stream of the literature that considers the presence of "green consumers" (see [2] and [6] inter alia), consumers are not affected by pollution. This assumption has indeed no repercussions on the results, as we show in Section 2.
Our main result is that the MQS bites only if the hedonic component of consumer preferences is high enough compared to the marginal environmental damage associated with production. This has consequences for social welfare. Indeed, the adoption of a binding MQS that diminishes product differentiation and increases industry output poses a trade-off between the price effect and the external effect, as consumers are able to purchase larger quantities at a lower price and enjoy a higher average quality, but this goes along with a higher amount of pollution. Hence, a binding MQS improves welfare not by shrinking the environmental damage but simply by increasing the average quality supplied to the market. We also prove that this applies when convex costs of quality improvement exist.
The Model
We consider a duopoly market for vertically differentiated products supplied by single-product firms. The demand side is modelled à la Mussa and Rosen [9] . There is a continuum of consumers whose types are identified by θ, uniformly distributed with density equal to 1 in the interval [0, ]. Parameter θ represents the consumers' marginal willingness to pay for quality. Each consumer is assumed to buy at most one unit of the vertically differentiated good in order to maximise the following surplus function:
where q i ∈ [0, Q] indicates the quality of the product and p i is the market price at which that variety is supplied by firm i = H, L, with q H ≥ q L . Therefore, the consumer who is indifferent between q H and q L is 1 Assuming partial coverage is conducive to a fully analytical solution. Additionally, it is also a realistic assumption in modelling markets where hedonic preferences and prices matter. Observe that those who are not able to purchase any of the vertically differentiated varieties have nonetheless access to an outside (undifferentiated) good whose utility is normalised to zero.
identified by the level of marginal willingness to pay θ that solves
and therefore
Thus, market demand for the high-quality good is x H = − θ. We assume partial market coverage, so that there is another consumer, identified by θ , who is indifferent between buying q L or not buying at all:
whereby θ = p L /q L and the demand for the inferior variety is θ − θ. Accordingly, we can define consumer surplus as follows:
On the supply side, for the sake of simplicity, we normalise production costs to zero, so that profit functions
2 Production entails a negative environmental externality s = b (x H + x L ), with b > 0, which is not related to the quality of the good. Assuming the environmental damage as a linear function of production is to simplify the analysis. To allow for a pollution being convex or concave in quantity would lead to qualitatively similar results, as long as s is increasing in industry output (see below). Also, note that consumers are assumed to be myopic, in the sense that Eq. (1) does not account for the presence of pollution.
3 Social welfare is determined by the sum of profits and consumer surplus, minus the environmental externality:
Competition takes place in two stages. In the first, firms choose qualities and in the second they compete in prices. The solution concept is the subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction.
Results
To begin with, we characterise optimal prices for any given quality pair. These are the same as in Choi and Shin [3] :
where superscript N stands for Nash equilibrium. As a preliminary result, note that, given the equilibrium prices, the introduction of an MQS may have ambiguous effects. Indeed, by substituting the equilibrium prices in s, we obtain
Differentiation with respect to q L yields
As a consequence, an increase in q L , like that generated by an MQS, brings about an increase in pollution parallel to an increase in industry output, as
This implies the following:
Lemma 1 There exists a trade-of f between the price ef fect and the external ef fect of MQS regulation, whereby a priori expanding output has ambiguous consequences.
Note that the above Lemma holds independently of the specific shape of s, the sufficient condition for it to apply being that s must be increasing in industry output. This can be easily appreciated by supposing that pollution be represented by a generic function s (X),
because ∂ X/∂q L > 0 as we know from previous literature on this matter. In the first stage of the unregulated game, the first- with the aim of maximising social welfare, thus affecting directly the behaviour of firm L. We reconstruct the introduction of the MQS via simultaneous play between firm H and the regulator at the first stage, according to the following problem:
Firm H's FOC remains unchanged, while the regulator solves
which is always positive if b = 0, i.e. in the limit case where pollution is absent altogether. From Eq. (11), we obtain
Note that Eq. (12) entails that vertical differentiation disappears through the adoption of the MQS whenever the weight of pollution is low enough, i.e. for all b ∈ 0, Q/6 . Moreover, from Eq. (12), one gets
Accordingly, we may state the following:
Lemma 2 The MQS decreases in b and increases in for all Q ∈ (6b /5, 6b ). For all Q ≥ 6b , the MQS is constant at Q.
The intuitive reason is that, since the MQS expands industry output, q MQS L reacts positively to an increase in market affluence and negatively to an increase in the weight of the external effect. This applies if the hedonic dimension of the market is outweighed by the external effect. Otherwise, the design of the MQS is driven solely by the hedonic dimension, leading the industry towards the replication of the perfectly competitive outcome. In the remainder, we focus on the parameter range wherein some degree of product differentiation exists.
At the regulated equilibrium, consumer surplus is
while the profits amount to
both positive for Q ∈ (6b /5, 6b ). Pollution is
and thus social welfare is
Now, observe that the MQS may not be binding, since
that is, for all Q ∈ (21b /11, 2b ), the MQS is indeed a maximum quality standard. Provided Q > 2b (so that q MQS L bites), it is also easy to verify that x
, and therefore total industry output indeed increases after the adoption of a binding MQS, because the latter brings about tougher price competition which translates into a demand increase for both varieties. Exactly the opposite applies for Q ∈ (21b /11, 2b ) .
Therefore, the impact of MQS regulation on social welfare is ambiguous: Proof See the Appendix.
At first sight, this result may indeed look quite counterintuitive. However, it can be spelled out in the following terms. Whenever the hedonic component of preferences is strong enough to yield a binding MQS, the resulting welfare increase is to be entirely imputed to the standard correction of the downward quality distortion generated by price competition rather than to a reduction in pollution. That is, if the market is affluent enough, the satisfaction of myopic consumers is more relevant than the increase in the external effect that necessarily goes along with it.
To complement the foregoing analysis, we now consider the corner solutions in which q Proposition 2 implies that, if the MQS is the highest technologically feasible quality, the trade-off is solved in favour of restricting at most the allocative inefficiencies due to quality competition, whereas if the MQS is nil, then x L = 0, which amounts to saying that the regulator induces a market structure that restricts the environmental damage the most by assigning monopoly power to the high-quality firm.
Finally, we show that our results are qualitatively similar even if firms incur in convex fixed costs of quality improvement. 4 Consider
First, observe that in the second stage, the equilibrium prices are identical to Eq. (6). In the first stage, now ∂π H /∂q H has an inner maximum point so that in general, q
whereas in the regulated case, the FOC of the government yields
Of course now, it is not possible to derive the analytical solutions of q * L and q
MQS L
. In order to assess the introduction of an MQS, we follow the procedure introduced by Spence [11] by evaluating the sign of Proof See the Appendix.
As a consequence, the fact that in the same range W MQS > W N , or equivalently
is due to the price effect enhancing consumer surplus largely enough to more than offset the reduction in industry profits and the increase in the environmental externality. Moreover, firms now compete over a product that now consumers value more. That is to say, the introduction of a binding MQS causes an increase in the average quality available to consumers as compared to the unregulated setting. 
Proof of Proposition 3
By adding Eq. (26) to Eq. (28) and subtracting Eq. (27), we obtain Eq. (21). Therefore, as in Proposition 1, the fact that W MQS > W N is due to an increase in consumer surplus large enough to more than compensate the reduction in industry profits and the increase in the environmental externality.
